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An Inquiry into the Nature of Money: An Alternative to the Functional Approach 





The paper argues that the functional approach of money does not provide a good method to study 
monetary history and monetary mechanisms. An alternative approach is developed and 
illustrated by analyzing the role of tobacco and cowry shells in past monetary systems. It is 
shown that any monetary system has specific properties that most students of money do not take 
into account when theorizing about money or analyzing its history. This leads them to miss some 
important points, and to see monetary systems where none exist. Hence, one can doubt some of 
the past research on the subject, at least until further investigation is conducted that is based, not 
on what we think “money” is, but on what its essential properties are. By comprehending what 
the main characteristics of a monetary system are, one is able to improve regulation of the 
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The history of money is a fascinating subject that can rapidly overwhelm its inquirer if he does 
not have a good theoretical conception of what “money” is. This theoretical conception helps to 
narrow the field of research of the inquirer and to make his argumentation stronger. Different 
theoretical frameworks will lead to different, sometimes opposite, types of inquiry and 
conclusion. This paper presents a framework that is argued to be superior to the existing methods 
of analysis of money. It extends the framework developed by MacLeod (1889), Innes (1913, 
1914), Keynes (1930), and others, and rests on asking not what money does, but what money is. 
By providing a more rigorous method to understand what “money” is, this framework gives 
some insights about monetary regulations and the role of taxes and bond issues for a sovereign 
government. 
Today, there are basically two ways to analyze monetary systems. Most modern 
economists use a narrow approach based on a Chicago view of society. Market exchange is 
assumed to have existed in different forms since most of the existence of human beings because 
of their propensity to barter and truck. In order to avoid the problem of double coincidence of 
wants, a unique commodity was progressively sorted out as the best for use in exchange (Jevons 
1875; Menger 1898). Thus, a monetary system can be detected by checking for the presence of a 
medium of exchange, which usually goes by checking for physical objects passing hands 
frequently. Einzig (1966), Quiggin (1949), and others argue against the narrowness of this and 
other approaches, and adopt the opposite stand by being as broad as possible in their 
understanding of money. For them, sociological and political factors are also important. Thus, 
this second approach, usually used by noneconomists, argues that “exchange” usually was not 
done principally, or even at all, for economic reasons and so the nonexistence of a double 
coincidence of wants was not a problem. Those authors, then, include in their classification of 
monetary instruments all kinds of objects as long as they perform all or parts of the functions of 
money. The distinction between “all purpose money” and “special purpose money,” used by 
Polanyi and others, follows the same approach.  
                                                 





The paper argues that both preceding approaches are theoretically flawed. They all 
rightly understand the importance of economic, sociological, and political factors; however, they 
examine those factors through an inappropriate method of inquiry. Indeed, both analyze money 
by its functions— “money is what money does” (Walker 1878; Dalton 1965; Hicks 1967). 
Studying the functions performed by money may provide some interesting additional facts, but 
this should be separated from the main analysis of monetary systems. One central reason is that, 
given its lack of rigor, the functional approach is highly based on the subjective view the 
inquirer. This leads either to select one principal function of money, or to pick and choose 
depending on the circumstances. This may lead the inquirer to force his own experience on what 
is going on in a particular society working under very different mechanisms (Dalton 1965). The 
functional approach also confuses monetary instruments (the things denominated in a unit of 
account) and the unit of account. An object cannot be a unit of account, even if it has the same 
name as the unit; the latter is necessarily abstract and independent of any objects. In addition, 
inquirers following the functional approach usually assume that monetary instruments must take 
a physical form, whereas they may exist mainly in an immaterial form.
2 In the end, this approach 
may lead to confuse monetary payments and in-kind payments, to assume that there is a 
monetary system where there is none, to make a truncated analysis of monetary systems 
consisting only in recollecting objects, or to miss completely the presence of a monetary system. 
  Thus, we must abandon this approach to the study of money. Monetary instruments are 
not defined by what they do, or by what inquirer thinks they do, but by intrinsic characteristics. 
For example, all monetary instruments are debt instruments and all monetary systems must start 
with a unit of account, de facto or de jure. Thus, monetary instruments sometimes can exist and 
never be used as a medium of exchange, means of payment, or store of value. Sometimes, 
monetary instruments may not perform any functions at all, exist without the existence of any 
circulating physical objects, or some objects may become monetary instruments and then may be 
demonetized. The point is to understand what “sometimes” means, that is to say, what the 
characteristics of a monetary instrument and system are and their implications. In order to do so, 
the paper is divided in three parts. The first part develops the basic framework set up by 
                                                 
2 Pryor (1977) is a good example of the problems that this creates. Through an empirical analysis, he claims to 
verify Polanyi’s theory of money, but does so by excluding an important item put forward by Polanyi, namely 




Tymoigne and Wray (2006). The second part of the paper draws on such framework by 
developing specific points. The last part uses the framework to study the use of cowry shells and 
tobacco as monetary instruments. 
 
2.  THE INTRINSIC PROPERTIES OF A MONETARY SYSTEM 
 
Tymoigne and Wray (2006) have put forward the following essential characteristics of a 
monetary system:  
 
1. The existence of a recording mechanism with a unit of account and tools to record 
 transactions.   
2. The unit of account must be social, that is, recognized as the unit in which debts and 
  credits are kept. 
3. Some tools (i.e., recording instruments) are financial instruments, that is, they record 
the fact that someone acknowledged he owes someone else a certain number of units of 
the unit of account. Anything can be a financial instrument, as long as it is first an 
acknowledgement of debt and, second, a denominated in a unit of account. 
4. Some financial instruments are monetary instruments, that is, are “generally accepted.” 
5. There may or may not exist a hierarchy of financial instruments, with one issuer (or a 
  small number of issuers) whose debts are usually used to clear accounts.  
 
Before any monetary instruments exist, there must be a unit of account. This unit may 
come from units of measure used for other purposes [for example, most past units of account 
were weight units (pound, lira) or land units (mark)], or may come from the pure imagination of 
its creators (like the Euro today). In any case, historically, units of account always have been 
imposed by an authority recognized by a body of individuals residing over a more or less large 
geographical space. This authority can be religious, political, military, economic, or others, for 
example, a village council.  
Once this unit exists and its purpose has been well specified, it is possible to develop 
some tools. The tools used are the carriers of the unit of account that help to keep scores, that is, 




whatever form: coins, piece of rock, casino chips, subway tokens, bookkeeping entries, notes, 
etc.) are used only internally by their creator to keep track of some specific information, they are 
not financial instruments but only recording instruments. If some tools are issued to external 
individuals as acknowledgment of debt, they are financial instruments.  
Because the latter are acknowledgments of debt, they have the following specifications 
besides being denominated in a given unit of account. They have a distinctive characteristic that 
allows its owner to know who issued them and how many units of the unit of account they carry 
(form, sign, name, size, color, etc.), and the issuer must have made the promise to accept them 
back (at discount, par, or premium) in payment whenever they mature. Stated another way, they 
have a predefined maturity that can go from instantaneous maturity (monetary instruments) to 
infinite maturity (corporate shares, consols).
3 
Financial instruments can be issued on whatever supports (wood, clay, papyrus, leather, 
metal, stone, computer memory, etc.) that best fit given the technology available, political 
considerations, cultural matters, emergency situations (e.g., Miller 1968), or other reasons. The 
support used does not matter to determine if financial instruments exist in an economy; however, 
it may have a strong impact on the working of the monetary system (Gresham’s law, price 
instability, poorly working payment system, etc.), especially if its net supply is hard to manage. 
For example, one of the problems of the monetary systems of the middle ages was that anybody 
who had gold or silver could issue the king’s debt instruments by going to the local mint. In 
addition, the reliance on a material that was hard to supply prevented the possibility of lender of 
last resort interventions. 
Continuing on the problem of the support used to carry the unit of account, one should 
not exclude a financial instrument from monetary instruments because it is not issued through 
traditional accounting methods—off-balance sheets items also obey the law of debit and credit 
and may also be generally accepted. For example, off-balance sheet credit lines (e.g., credit card 
accounts)
4 are part of the monetary instruments. Technically, credit lines are exactly the same 
things as demand deposits and both emerge from loans. If there were a type of bank loan that 
                                                 
3 It is better to qualify shares and consols as having an infinite maturity rather than no maturity because the latter 
may lead to confuse “no maturity” with “no predefined maturity.” Those financial instruments have a predefined 
maturity, which is that they never mature (i.e., the issuer is not contractually obligated to take them back). As shown 
later, the fact that commodities have no predefined maturity helps to explain why they are not money-things. 
4 However, a credit card is not a financial instrument—it does not have a maturity (credit card companies do not 




provided a demand deposit upon which one did not pay any interest as long as one did not use it, 
both would be conceptually the same thing. The only real difference would be that in order to 
access cash from credit lines one has to pay fees, making them more similar to time deposits. 
The use of off-balance sheet credit lines is just an innovation of banks to bypass a banking 
regulation based on a narrow functional view of what “money” is.  
Some financial instruments are transferable, that is, the original creditor can use them to 
pay a third party. In this case, they may or may not record the name of the original creditor, and, 
in the latter case, they are “impersonal.” Other financial instruments circulate at a value different 
from their par value, so the amount of unit of account that they carry changes with the number of 
third parties that are willing to acquire or to depart from them (the issuer usually accepts back his 
financial instruments at par value when they mature). For example, a bond with a $100 face 
value may be used to pay a third party, but it may only allow to reimburse $90 of debt toward 
this third party, or it may allow payment of $200 of debts. 
Some financial instruments have the following characteristics: their maturity is 
instantaneous, they are always accepted at par value, and they are impersonal. Their degree of 
transferability of the unit of account or payment capacity is infinite. This type of financial 
instrument is a monetary instrument. As developed later, this is what “general acceptance” really 
means. For example, a check is a financial instrument but usually not a monetary instrument 
because it is personal (it names the receiver) and is hard to transfer to a third party without facing 
a discount.  
If some financial instruments have an instantaneous maturity, they should circulate at the 
value the issuer takes them back in payment. Thus, if the issuer is ready to take his financial 
instruments back at par, arbitrages should eliminate the possibility that they circulate at a 
premium or at a discount. However, lack of technological developments, misunderstanding of 
how to manage a monetary system, and other factors may prevent this arbitrage between third 
parties to take place. This is especially the case the further a financial instrument is from its 
issuer. As shown below, history has a way of complicating things because the preceding factors 
enter into play. 
Capitalist economies are monetary economies, that is, economies in which money drives 
economic decisions. Monetary systems exist in both monetary and non-monetary economies 




depending on the type of economy: pyramidal monetary system or flat monetary system. In a 
pyramidal monetary system, there are several types of financial instrument classified by their 
degree of transferability, with the most transferable at the top (today coins, central bank notes, 
and deposits at the central bank). In a flat monetary system, everybody uses the same financial 
instrument or all existing financial instruments have the same degree of transferability. This type 
of monetary system seems rare, if it ever existed; it is more probable that we went directly from a 
recording system to a pyramidal monetary system. 
In the end, one reaches a definition of a monetary system that does not rely on any 
functions but on two characteristics: the existence of a unit of account and of financial 
instruments. A unit of account is not what money does, it is part of what money is. Financial 
instruments have not been defined in terms of any functions, and it is not how one can 
differentiate between a financial instrument and a monetary instrument. Some of the points 
presented above are developed below to clarify their implications and to see the limits of a 
functional approach to money. 
 
3. SPECIFIC  POINTS 
 
3.1  Financial Instruments: Logical and Cultural Uses 
Financial instruments are all promises to deliver, promises to be able to get in the future. Their 
logical use is to allow inter-temporal choices. Thus, financial instruments can be issued even 
though they are not backed by a higher form of financial instrument. Banks do not need reserves 
to make loans, checks can be draw without having funds on a bank account, and derivatives are 
issued even though the thing they promise to deliver does not exist at issuance. The 
macroeconomic implication of this is that a pre-existing amount of (financial) saving is not 
needed to start investment. It is, in fact, against the logic of financial instruments to wait for the 
things they promise to deliver before issuing them. By creating a bet against the future, financial 
instruments may generate instability, but one cannot solve this by requiring a 100% backing 
without at the same time killing the economic dynamics that these instruments aim at creating.  
Some financial instruments (and so, some monetary instruments), given the way 
individuals are accustomed to use them, are not conceived as financial instruments in the sense 




subjectivity of the inquirer is strong. The following may help to illustrate this point. We start 
with an extract from a discussion of “The Value of Money” by Francis A. Walker: 
 
He [Walker] says a bank note is money, but that a check drawn against a bank deposit is not. 
  What is a bank note except a cashier’s check upon a bank deposit? I think we need to make a 
  distinction, […] and I should put into a different category those instruments of exchange which 
  are of the nature of titles to money, but are not themselves lawful money. A bank note is a title to 
  money, but it is not itself money according to any true discrimination, nor is it legal tender, 
  because it cannot be forced upon a creditor. (Atkinson 1894) 
 
Thus, Atkinson’s position is that we should consider state bank notes as equivalent to the 
way we conceived checks today—simple orders of transfer. At the same time, however, 
Markham notes that in the United States, state chartered “banks were left with the task of 
creating devices that could serve as currency,” and that “bank notes were only rarely redeemed 
for specie” (Markham 2002). Thus, Markham counts bank notes as part of the money stock and 
ranges with Walker. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) also count state bank notes as part of the 
money stock. In the end, a reader may be left on his own to decide what is and what is not 
“money.”  
The framework developed here should help an inquirer to figure out what is and what is 
not a financial instrument. According to this framework, one cannot assume that bank notes are 
just a representation of “money on the flow,” with demand deposits representing where “money” 
accumulates. Demand deposits are just one method to accumulate the unit of account; one could 
decide to hold all his “money” in the form of bank notes.  
What applies to bank notes also applies to checks. Checks are financial instruments, not 
simple orders of transfer; they have a defined value in terms of a unit of account and an 
instantaneous maturity. They fall short on being monetary instruments because they name the 
receiver and are usually not transferable. One could conceive that people decide to accumulate 
their surplus of unit of account in the form of checks and that checks become generally accepted 
(as defined below). The fact that it is illegal to write blank checks knowingly does not imply that 
checks are only orders of transfer. This legal requirement applies to all financial instruments—
one should not issue knowing he will not be able to reimburse (lying about a project, ponzi 





3.2.  Acknowledgements of Debt and Clearing Methods 
An acknowledgement of debt states (explicitly or implicitly) the number of units of the unit of 
account someone must provide to someone else in the future. However, most IOUs do not 
specify how the delivery of these units should be made.
5 A corollary point is that the finality of 
payment does not imply that a transfer of monetary instrument (or even legal tender monetary 
instruments) must be implemented. All that is required is that a certain amount of the unit of 
account be transferred from the debtor to the creditor at maturity so that debts are cleared; this 
can take whatever forms as long as the creditor agrees. The methods through which payments are 
made are only limited by the imaginations of creditors and debtors.  
Thus, simply stating “I owe you $10” does not mean that someone promises to deliver 
cash or any other specific form of monetary instruments for a total of $10. It only means that 
someone promises to deliver ten units of the unit of account named Dollar. This can be delivered 
in many forms. One essential way is by giving back to a creditor some of his IOUs for an amount 
of $10. Another way, if a debtor does not have his creditor’s IOUs, is by transferring units of 
account by using cash or other monetary instruments. Also, it is possible that payment takes 
place with a lower financial instrument than a monetary instrument, or even a lower form of debt 
than the debt that it clears. Finally, payment in kind can also be a solution to clear a debt. 
For example, let us assume that ten units of dollar were created via the issuance of an 
acknowledgement of debt by a firm F to a bank B, in exchange for the generally accepted 
financial instrument of the latter. We have: 
 
   B a n k   B    F i r m   F  
Assets Liabilities  Assets Liabilities 
LoanF $10  DDF $10  DDF $10  LoanF $10 
 
The repayment of this debt by F at maturity can take many forms. First, by bring back to 
B $10 of its debt, F is able to credit its demand deposit with $10. Another solution is for F to 
bring to B some cash (central bank financial instruments). These first two cases represent a 
payment made with similar or higher level financial instruments, however, the bank may also 
                                                 




accept in payment from F a commercial paper from another firm F1, so that the loan is cleared as 
followed (assuming, to simplify, no discounting of the commercial paper): 
 
 
   B a n k   B    F i r m   F  
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
LoanF -$10  
CPF1 $10 
 CPF1 -$10  LoanF -$10 
 
 
In this case, bank B has accepted a lower acknowledgement of debt than the ones it issues 
as means of payment. A payment in kind would replace the entry CPF1 by a physical object. Note 
that the payment in those two cases is final and does not require the use of any top monetary 
instruments. Thus, defining “money” as “that which passes from hand to hand in final discharge 
of debts and full payment for goods” (Walker 1878) is too broad to be useful for the study of 
monetary systems. 
One thing to note as an aside is that the term “bank loan” is a misnomer for the previous 
initial transaction. It is not a loan; it is an exchange of debt instruments between a private 
individual and a bank. The bank does not lend anything that it owns, it just creates a debt 
instrument (demand deposits). In exchange, non-bank agents give their own debt instruments 
(that materialized as a bookkeeping entry on the asset side of the balance sheet of banks— “loan 
to X” or, more rigorously, “advance to X”). Banks agree to accept their demand deposit in 
payment whenever presented to them, individuals promise to take back their financial 
instruments by paying banks at a given maturity. 
 
3.3.  Special Purpose Money and Payment in Kind 
Many studies on “primitive money” have been performed and two famous ones are by Einzig 
(1966) and Quiggin (1949). They describe how objects were used in payment for compensations 
of debts “incurred not as a result of economic transaction, but of events like marriage, killing, 
coming of age, being challenged to potlatch, joining a secret society, etc.” (Polanyi 1957). Those 




if they gave them away. It is assumed that these objects were monetary instruments because they 
performed the function of means of payment or medium of exchange for specific transactions—
they were “special purpose money” (Polanyi 1957). This view, however, can be disputed.  
There is ample evidence that objects have been used by “debtors” to compensate 
“creditors,” and that “creditors” were able to use these objects later to pay for compensations. 
However, all the characteristics of what make a financial instrument were absent. First, there was 
no unit of account in which the compensations, and the objects used to compensate, were 
denominated. There was no unit of account because one could not count anything independently 
of the presence of the recording instrument. In fact, it took several millennia to develop a 
uniform numerical system, starting from 8000 B.C. with concrete counting to 3100 B.C with the 
creation of abstract counting (Schmandt-Besserat 1992; Nissen, Damerow, and Englund 1993; 
Englund 2004). Second, the objects had no sign that defined who the issuer was and they had no 
predefined maturity. All this is illustrated by the fact that the payment of a compensation could 
go through several ways defined by what the elders said was appropriate: ten pigs, five cows, 
twenty chickens, a round piece of rock, thirty bags of potatoes, or whatever else is felt relevant. 
Thus, some individual may stay stuck with an object until the elders say it is appropriate to give 
this object in payment. Therefore, unless new archival sources (which sometimes exist as the 
example of cowry shells below shows) appear to add to our available information, transactions 
with “primitive money” or “special purpose money” should be seen as transfers of “treasure 
items, wealth, valuables, and heirlooms” (Dalton 1965), i.e., a transfer in kind, rather than as a 
monetary payment.  
Some of these objects may also have been used as recording instruments, like we use 
marks on a calendar (or when we put an object at an unusual place) to remind ourselves of 
something. They helped the population to remember who owes or owed something.  
 
3.4.  Pyramidal Monetary System, Flat Monetary System, and Recording System 
Typically, financial instruments are conceived as means of “providing money now for money 
latter.” They credit debtors with the amount of monetary instruments they need. Indeed, even 
though everybody can issue financial instruments, not everybody can get them generally 
accepted. Thus, one needs to swap his financial instrument with the ones accepted as monetary 




In a flat monetary system, or for the top issuer, there is no swapping involved. However, 
the top monetary instruments are still acknowledgements of debt because they fulfill the 
definition of a financial instrument—the issuer promises to accept them back at a given par value 
in payment when they mature. How, then, are those specific financial instruments made 
acceptable if creditworthiness does not play a role? Innes provides the answer when the top 
issuer is the modern (federal) state: 
 
The government by law obliges certain selected person to become its debtors. It declares that so-
  and-so, who imports goods from abroad, shall owe the government so much on all that he 
  imports, or that so-and-so, who owns land, shall owe to the government so much per acre. This 
  procedure is called levying a tax […]. (Innes 1913) 
 
 
People who are credited with the monetary instrument issued by the state are willing to 
accept it because their issuance is coupled with the creation of a due toward the state—the need 
to pay tax in the future. Thus, in a monetary system, taxes are not a source of funds for the top 
issuer, they serve as reflux mechanism, that is, they bring back to the top issuer its financial 
instruments (Lerner 1943). Before the existence of nation-states, there were monetary authorities 
who levied monetary dues in different forms: tax, fines, duties, fees, offerings, tributes, etc. 
In a pyramidal monetary system, the top issuer may decide to issue a range of more or 
less transferable financial instruments that promise to swap back to the top monetary instrument. 
All this has several implications that are fully developed elsewhere (Lerner 1943; Bell 2000; 
Wray 2003a). First, in order to be able to issue those instruments, the top issuer must have issued 
some monetary instruments first, so that other economic agents are able to buy the less 
transferable instruments. Second, there is a swapping involved; however, it is very easy to do 
because the top issuer issues the top financial instruments. Third, if the government redeems 
bonds by issuing notes or coins, its indebtedness has not changed a bit. It has only swapped a 
financial instrument and a monetary instrument. The only way to reduce the government debt 
would be to have a reflux without an injection, which means taxing, fining, etc. All these points 
show that the issue of bonds by the top issuer does not represent a borrowing operation. The 




instruments. Today, Treasury bonds are part of an interest-rate management strategy of the 
central bank.
6  
What applies to the state today, applied in flat, or nearly flat, monetary systems like 
ancient Mesopotamia or Egypt around 3000 B.C. (Hudson 2000, 2004; Hudson and Wunsch 
2004; Henry 2004). Those monetary systems, however, also provide additional insights into 
understanding the difference between a recording system and a monetary system. The religious 
authorities first used a unit of account for internal purposes to record the inflows and outflows of 
grains, cattle, and other goods between different religious departments. The authorities also used 
the unit of account to record the dues they imposed on others and to check that debtors complied 
with their obligations. Initially, one can think that this system did not contain any financial 
instruments and so there was no monetary system. Indeed, nobody was a creditor in terms of the 
unit of account because the religious authorities did not issue any acknowledgments of debt; they 
imposed a debt on people and recorded its fulfillment, so this was only a recording system. 
However, financial instruments appeared rapidly for two reasons. Some of the debtors could 
more than fulfill their dues and got a net credit in terms of the unit of account, while others were 
granted advances by the religious authorities, which were mostly in physical, but also in 
monetary, forms (advances of unit of account) (Nissen, Damerow, and Englund 1993; Hudson 
and Wunsch 2004). As long as only the first case existed (if it did), the monetary system was flat, 
and when loans were granted the system became pyramidal with two levels (the monetary 
instrument of religious authorities and the financial instruments of borrowers). In addition, as 
some people became creditors in terms of the unit of account, techniques to transfer those credits 
developed, i.e., fully transferable financial instruments emerged. Innes, for example, talks about 
the circulation of sealed shubati, but pure transfer of credit to pay next dues was another 
possibility.  
One can see that recording system and monetary system are different—the first, contrary 
to the second, does not contain any financial instruments (i.e., nobody issued a recognition of 
debt to a creditor). In a recording system, there may or may not be a unit of account, and early 
tribal societies with primitive recording system probably did not need a unit of account given the 
small amount of things to track. A unit of account emerged with the need to improve the 
                                                 
6 Note that all this could be achieved just by paying interest on reserves. In this case, the issuance of bonds would be 




redistribution mechanism of the first large economies and took a long time to develop, as stated 
earlier. The functional approach of money distinguishes between the two mechanisms only by 
checking if only “credit” (rather than “money”) exists. Thus, for example, if nobody uses an 
object to exchange but everything is done in terms of bookkeeping, there is only a recording 
system that keeps score of who is in surplus and who is in deficit. However, beside employing 
vague terms, this position eliminates the possibility that credits on a book are generally 
transferable to a third party for final payment.  
 
3.5.  Acceptance and Value of Financial Instruments 
The acceptance of a financial instrument rests on the expected capacity of its issuer to “acquire 
credits,” i.e., “to force cash flows,” from others (Innes 1913; Minsky 1986a) and the time it will 
take for the issuer to become a creditor. By getting future inflows of a unit of account (via either 
monetary instruments or other forms), one is expected to be able to swap back to their financial 
instrument; creditworthiness is the determining factors of acceptance. The lower the 
creditworthiness, the higher the discount; that is, the less monetary units a financial instrument 
can carry in payments relative to its par value (Innes 1913). For the top issuer, creditworthiness 
is not a concern because no (relevant) swapping will be involved. In this case, the expected 
capacity to collect on dues imposed on others now creates a demand for the monetary instrument 
(and, indirectly, all other financial instruments the top issuer issues); this is a special form of 
creditworthiness that is better characterized as sovereignty (Wray 2003b). 
The actual capacity to acquire credits affects the value of circulating financial instruments 
through its impacts on creditworthiness. Indeed, acknowledgements of debt must be able to come 
back to their issuers when needed so that their value is preserved, i.e., the creditworthiness of the 
issuer is confirmed. The role of the reflux mechanism is, therefore, very important. If there is no 
reflux, there is a refinancing process that, as shown below, leads to inflation or to a depreciation 
of the currency.  
In conclusion, the acceptance of a monetary instrument does not rest principally on the 
material used to issue them but on the economic (and/or political) credibility of the issuer. This 
is, of course, in perfect accordance with the nature of financial instruments, as they represent bets 
against the future. Analyzing and listing the materials used (as the functional approach tends to 




of precious metals may boost the acceptance if the credibility of the issuer is low by acting as 
collateral. However, the law of credit requires that the face value of, say, gold coins be higher 
than the value of the gold content. Out of the space of influence of the issuing government, 
where nobody paid taxes to the latter and so no reflux mechanisms exist (assuming that the 
government is not involved in profitable economic activities), gold coins issued by the latter may 
circulate only at intrinsic value. The choice between melting down the coins and keeping them 
depends on which solution gives more of the unit of account desired. All this applies to paper 
monetary instruments or immaterial monetary instruments which have no intrinsic value and so 
nobody would accept them if credibility was not good; their value would be nil, i.e., they could 
not carry any units of the unit of account. 
 
3.6.  The Value of the Unit of Account 
If the capacity of the issuer to implement a reflux mechanism is essential for the maintenance of 
the value of his financial instrument, there may be situations in which the value of all financial 
instruments changes at the same time, either relative to the value of goods and services (inflation 
or deflation) or relative to another unit of account (depreciation or appreciation). These changes 
are due either to the discretionary decisions of the monetary authority (exchange rate 
devaluation/reevaluation) or to mechanisms at work in the monetary system. The first case is 
straightforward, but the second case requires more explanations.  
Indeed, the value of a unit of account depends on how hard it is to get. It is initially 
possible to get access to the unit of account via transferable financial instruments that carry this 
unit, either by earning an income, by being granted a credit from suppliers of monetary 
instruments,
7 or by government spending in the economy. The less effort income earners (or 
borrowers, given the credit standards) have to put out in order to get access to the unit of 
account, the less valuable the latter is, given the existing reflux mechanisms. In addition, 
government spending injects reserves and cash, respectively, in the banking system and the non-
banking sector. The larger the size of government spending, the easier the access to the unit of 
account, and so the less valuable it is given the reflux mechanisms. 
                                                 
7 These suppliers can be domestic or foreign agents, but the latter do not have access to the refinancing source 




In the end, thus, in terms of the domestic economy, if it is too hard to get access to get the 
unit of account (e.g., too low wage, too strict credit standards), the economy will tend to be 
deflationary, and if it is too easy to get, the economy will tend to be inflationary. This will be the 
tendency because the final effect will depend on the elasticity of the supply conditions of goods 
and services, the way financial instruments are used, and the strength of the reflux mechanisms.  
The same factor affects the relationship between units of account. Reflux mechanisms, 
like capacity to export goods and services and to get net income payments from the rest of the 
world, affect the relative value of two units of account (Minsky 1979, 1986c). In addition, the 
capacity to accommodate a willingness of surplus units to switch their portfolio plays a central 
role. However, because monetary authorities cannot manage the top monetary instruments of 
other monetary systems (and because they are not large enough creditors in foreign currencies), 
portfolio movements can lead to large depreciations or appreciations of the domestic unit of 
account relative to foreign units of account unless monetary authorities coordinate their efforts. 
In the end therefore, inflation, depreciation, etc. are not related only to the possibility that 
there is “too much money,” but also to the quality of the debt instruments issued, that is, how 
hard it is to get them, given the injection mechanisms and the reflux mechanisms. Monetary 
instruments do not fall from the sky, and assuming that it is “as if” they did truncates the analysis 
of monetary mechanisms. As debt instruments, they are created with the needs of the economic 
process. This does not exclude the possibility of monetary inflation or the possibility of 
exogenous sources of money supply,
8 but the latter are not the only sources (Minsky 1991).  
 
3.7.  Unit of Account and Monetary Instruments 
The relationship between a unit of account and a financial instrument is different from the one 
supposed by the functional approach. Typically, an object is said to be “all-purpose money” 
when it fulfills all the functions of money—it is a unit of account, medium of exchange, store of 
                                                 
8 The only source of exogenous money supply today is government spending (G, if G is defined broadly) (Mosler 
and Forstater 1998; Wray 1998). This leads to an injection of top monetary instruments that takes different names 
depending where it goes: either to the banking system (reserves), to households (cash), to foreign households 
(foreign currency). Today, this injection (that goes mainly through the banking system) is offset constantly by the 
central bank in order to maintain the short-term rates on target (Bell 2000; Wray 2003a). The necessity for the 
central bank to do so is true under any monetary systems in which the Treasury has an account at the central bank; 




value, and a means of payment. The problem with this approach is that a unit of account is not a 
function of money; there cannot be “money” if there is no unit of account in the first place.  
A unit of account can take the name of an object, however, once created, it has an 
independent existence from the object. This manifests itself in two ways—the object may 
disappear but the unit of account used for the monetary system will persist, or the relationship 
between the unit of account and the object can change. Taking, for example, the case of cowries. 
A cowry unit of account may exist without any cowry shells being used as financial instruments. 
If cowries are used as financial instruments, their value in terms of the cowry unit may change— 
one cowry shell may be worth one cowry at one time and three cowries at another time. A 
similar case exists, for example, with the new and old franc of 1959. A coin of 1 franc before 
1959 was worth 1 franc unit and 0.01 franc unit after 1959. This change in the method of 
recording surplus and deficits is completely at the discretion of the monetary authority.
9 
Thus, the unit of account is not a function of money; it is one of the characteristics of a 
monetary system, the other one being the existence of financial instruments. A unit of account 
cannot be a medium of exchange, a store of value, or a means of payment. Like a medium of 
exchange, a store of value and a means of payment cannot be a unit of account. Stated another 
way, a monetary system necessitates a unit of account and carriers of this unit of account, but 
they have separate roles—one measures, the other records the measure. 
 
3.8.   The “General Acceptance” of Monetary Instruments 
The difference that is made between different financial instruments is usually based on their 
degree of acceptance between economic agents—monetary instruments are financial instruments 
that are “generally accepted.” The notion of medium of exchange is supposed to reflect that; a 
thing that is observed to be accepted by everybody in economic transactions.  
There are, however, problems with an understanding of “general acceptance” as meaning 
a media of exchange accepted by everybody. First, this view lacks a rigorous definition of what 
“general” means. If general acceptance means that 100% of the population must be accepting a 
medium,
10 this condition is usually never realized. Indeed, there is a direct counter example with 
                                                 
9 This change, however, does not represent a change in the value of the unit of account relative to goods and services 
because the value of everything is redefined to correspond to the new counting method.  




some shops refusing to be paid in cash. If “general” means that a large portion of the population 
accepts a medium in payment, this vague definition leaves the inquirer with too much suggestive 
interpretation to be valuable. What is a “large” portion? 90%? 80%? 70%? Less? In the end, the 
notion of general acceptance, defined in terms of circulation among the population, is hard to 
implement and leads to either a very restrictive view or a very general view. Second, there are 
monetary instruments that are never, or only rarely, used in exchange. For example, 
commemorative or “special” coins are usually not used as media of exchange; therefore, if 
someone in 1000 years looks back at our monetary system by taking the medium of exchange 
function as criteria, he will exclude those coins, even though they are monetary instruments. 
Third, as shown later with tobacco, some media of exchange may exist and be extensively used 
in payments but may not be financial instruments and so cannot be considered monetary 
instruments. In the end, therefore, the notion of general acceptance is not related to any 
proportion of the population accepting an object in exchange.  
One counter argument here could be that “general acceptance” simply means that people 
are legally required to accept a medium as ultimate means of payment when settlements are done 
in courts—monetary instruments are legal tenders. However, it is not hard to counter argue that 
most monetary systems did not and do not have legal tender laws. For example, the United States 
did not have any legal tender laws before 1862, and currently the Eurozone does not have any 
legal tender laws. Thus, the notion of “general acceptance” does not rest on the existence of legal 
tender laws. In addition, as the example of tobacco below makes it clear, just imposing that a 
medium should be accepted in payment does not qualify it as monetary instrument. Other 
conditions have to be verified. 
The meaning of “general acceptance” has to be redefined—it means that the payment 
capacity of a financial instrument is infinite. This means that three conditions must be satisfied: 
instantaneous maturity, circulation at a defined monetary denomination (i.e., value in terms of a 
unit of account), and it is impersonal. First, the maturity of a financial instrument must be 
instantaneous, that is, its issuer must be ready to accept it back at any time in payment, possibly 
immediately after he issued it and from the same person to whom he issued it. Second, the 
capacity of payment must stay constant in terms of the unit of account, that is, it is accepted by a 
third party at no discount and no premium, unless the issuer decides to change the amount of unit 




specific creditor should be named—they must be impersonal in terms of receiver. This includes 
financial instruments for which the name of the receiver appears but can be erased or crossed 
over and replaced by another receiver—a complicated way to materialize the impersonality of a 
financial instrument. 
 
3.9. Monetization,  Demonetization 
The preceding subsections help to comprehend when something becomes a monetary instrument 
and when it ceases to be so. A commodity is not intrinsically a financial instrument but can 
become so, or even a monetary instrument, but one has to avoid several traps. Two of them are 
that, first, as noted earlier, checking for the existence of a medium of exchange will do a poor 
job. Second, even if this goes in the right direction, checking if a commodity has a constant price 
is only a very partial indication of the monetary nature of a commodity. Grierson (1977) and 
others used this criterion to differentiate “money” and “money substitutes.” However, this 
criteria only tells us that the price of a commodity is administered and fails to consider other 
crucial criteria, for example, the fact that the one who produced the commodity must be ready to 
accept it back in payment: 
 
A moment’s reflection shows that a staple commodity could not be used as money, because ex 
 hypothesi, the medium is equally receivable by all members of the community. Thus if the fishers 
  paid for their supplies in cod, the trader would equally have to pay for their cod in cod, an 
  obvious absurdity. (Innes 1913) 
 
If a commodity is used by an entity to make payment, and if this entity accepts back the 
commodity in payment at a defined maturity date, then, given the existence of a clear value in 
terms of the unit of account and of a sign showing who the issuer is, it is a financial instrument. 
If, in addition, the commodity circulates at par, is impersonal, and is accepted back whenever 
presented to the issuer, it is a monetary instrument. Thus, for example, a monetary system based 
on a gold standard does not have gold pieces at the top of the pyramid even though it may have 
gold coins. A gold bullion would be a financial instrument if it respected all the conditions for 
becoming so: impersonal (it is), distinctive sign of the issuer (none), well-defined par value 
(none, unless the issuer says at what price he will accept it back in payment), defined maturity 
(none). Thus, a settlement of debts with gold bullions is not a monetary payment but an in-kind 




economy and if it sells gold bullions it removes monetary instruments from the economy. The 
closest monetary instruments to gold bullions are full-bodied coins, i.e., coins with a par value 
equal to their precious metal content. This type of financial instrument is, however, rare and 
inappropriate for an obvious reason—it creates such an intense speculation between the price of, 
say, gold and the par value of the coins that it cannot be a good base to create a stable monetary 
system. Owners would melt coins down to sell the gold whenever more units of the unit of 
account could be obtained than the par value. Sargent and Velde (1997) provide a historical 
study of the instability of monetary systems based on full-bodied coins. 
A financial instrument is demonetized when it ceases to be an acknowledgment of debt 
(the issuer will not accept it back in payment), if its payment capacity starts fluctuating among 
third parties for other reasons than changes in the par value by the issuer, or if the issuer 
suddenly states that he will accept his financial instrument in payment only after a period of 
time. This excludes some important cases for which monetary instruments are used for non-
monetary purposes. For example, collectors may be ready to pay a hundred times the par value of 
a commemorative $1 note or a low-issue 25-cent coin; others may collect foreign currencies that 
nobody will accept in the country of their collectors. In addition, anthropologists noted that when 
coins were introduced in Africa, some indigenous tribes used them both as monetary instruments 
and as decoration, or even totally forgot about their monetary use. None of these cases represent 
a demonetization of a financial instrument; they represent a non-monetary use of a monetary 
instrument.  
In conclusion, a monetary instrument can cease to be used as means of payment, media of 
exchange, store of value, or all of them at the same time (like foreigners collecting coins), but 
still be a monetary instrument. Monetization and demonetization are explained by other means 
than the fulfillment of one or several functions. 
 
3.10.  Money and Credit 
Sometimes a difference is made between “money” and “credit” on the basis that the former does 
not promise to provide a higher form of monetary instrument. Indeed, we saw earlier that 
financial instruments are usually conceived as instruments that provide access to monetary 
instruments with the promise to swap back in the future. There are, however, two problems with 




First, this distinction confounds clearing mechanisms and the nature of acknowledgments 
of debt. As shown earlier, the payment of a debt can take many forms, some not involving any 
higher form of financial instruments. The only specific characteristic of acknowledgments of 
debt is that the person who issued them promises to accept them back in the future in payment 
(which implies that they have a defined value in terms of a unit of account, a sign of the issuer, 
and a predefined maturity). 
Second, as stated earlier, all monetary instruments are financial instruments, and all 
financial instruments are debt instruments. An acknowledgement of debt is a relationship 
between a creditor and a debtor, and monetary instruments do not escape this relationship. Thus, 
the things that are usually conceived as “money,” like notes and coins, are the debts of the 
government—they are recorded at the liability side of the balance sheets of the central bank or 
the Treasury. They are liabilities, not because they promise a higher form of financial instrument, 
which they do not, but because the government promises to take them back in payment whenever 
presented to it. Considering Federal Reserve notes and coins as “pure assets” leads one to see 
strange paradoxes where there are none. For example, it seems crazy that the government 
destroys coins and notes by truckloads whenever it receives them. However, if one understands 
that they are just transferable promissory notes (that play the same role as when a person writes 
an IOU on a piece of paper and gives it to someone), the government has no use for them, and, 
on the contrary, wants to destroy them to eliminate any proof of debt.  
 
3.11.  Some Complications Due to History 
We are accustomed to monetary systems working smoothly with well-defined monetary 
instruments being used over a well-defined geographical space. We are also used to a State 
having a strong hold on all the monetary system, bringing the uniformity and regulation so much 
needed for a well-working monetary system. History, however, shows how difficult it was to 
establish this. For example, in the middle ages, coins had been issued by a multitude of 
individuals, their value was changing daily and fluctuating widely, and their area of circulation 
was never well known. In addition, royal powers were constantly contested, leading to areas of 
influence moving all the time as wars were won or lost. Finally, precious metals, that may have 
been first used to limit counterfeiting, boosted the acceptance of issuers with a low 




money is. This increased the instability of monetary systems; even more so because the net 
supply of gold and other precious metal was erratic and not well controlled. 
In terms of our framework, this implies that it was actually very hard to find perfect 
monetary instruments, notably ones that circulate at par all the time. Coins, for example, even if 
they were accepted immediately in payment by their issuers and were impersonal debt 
instruments, did not respect the par-value condition and so cannot be considered as strict 
monetary instruments—they were imperfect monetary instruments, like most financial 
instruments at this time. They are several reasons for this. First, coins did not have any value 
inscribed on them and so their value “was carried out by royal proclamation in all the public 
squares, fairs, and markets, at the instigation of the ordinary provincial judges: bailiffs, 
seneschals, and lieutenants” (Boyer-Xambeu, Deleplace, and Gillard 1994). With kings and other 
individuals issuing coins in a not well-regulated system, it was sometimes hard to know what the 
official value of a coin was, especially in remote areas or far from the issuer’s area of influence. 
Second, kings and other issuers of coins complicated the determination of the value of their coins 
by crying them down or up too often (i.e., changing their par value), leading to a situation in 
which “there were so many edicts in force referring to changes in the value of the coins, that 
none but an expert could tell what the value of various coins of different issues were, and they 
became highly speculative commodities” (Innes 1913). Indeed, if crying down a currency can be 
considered as a normal way to tax citizens (the nominal value of their coins holding is 
decreased), abusing it led to two types of speculation: one regarding the occurrence of a future 
crying down, another concerning the value of the coins relative to the value of the precious metal 
content. In this condition, bankers or moneychangers usually refused to take coins at par, 
expecting a future crying down, or at other times, they accepted them at premium expecting a 
rise in the price of gold or silver. This last speculative channel was compounded by the 
uncertainties surrounding the supply channels of new precious metals. 
All this seems to bring back the subjectivity of the functional approach because we 
“know” coins were monetary instruments, but the framework we developed does not seem to 
accept them unless it is stretched to accommodate history and coins are classified as “imperfect” 
monetary instruments. One could claim then that all previous systems of exchange were 
“imperfect” monetary systems. However, this is not the case, the reason for the imperfection 




experience, political forces, economic forces, and cultural forces led to set up and to manage 
wrongly monetary systems. For example, there was a reliance on precious material, and the value 
at which an instrument was taken back in payment frequently changed. Like any badly built 
piece of machinery, monetary systems often broke down and led to approximate results. Another 
important problem during the middle ages was the difficulty of carrying information about 
changes in the par value efficiently. This led to long delays between the announcement and the 
time the new par value was fully in place; given the frequency of changes, the monetary system 
never had a chance to adapt fully. In addition, some carriers of the king’s debts may have been in 
isolated areas where the king’s officials, or external people (like merchants) who were in closer 
proximity to the king’s area of influence, rarely went. This led some coins and other instruments 
with instantaneous maturity to circulate at discount between third parties, but, given everything 
else, the closer to its issuer a coin was, the closer it should be to its par value. Finally, some coins 
may have circulated at a premium, not only because of speculative concerns, but also because 
there were not enough coins to pay the dues to the king in this form. 
Thus, all the imperfections can be explained fairly simply by following the framework we 
set up, and there is no wild guess to make in order to decide if something is or is not a monetary 
instrument. All the properties were there to make the system work correctly, providing that other 
non-monetary factors were set up appropriately. All of this shows that the study of money is 
broader than the simple study of monetary instruments or the economics of it—monetary 
systems do not operate in a vacuum. 
 
3.12.  Conclusion: A Rejection of the Functional Approach of Money 
Thus, the supposed “functions” of “money” do not provide a reliable guideline to study monetary 
history and monetary mechanisms because they do not define what “money” is. They blurred 
together the crucial distinction between monetary instruments and unit of account, and they do 
not provide a systematic guideline to tell when there is a monetary system and when there is 
none. One may then be led to confuse a monetary payment with a payment in kind, and vice 
versa, and to concentrate all the analysis on the categorization of objects.  
The only characteristic of a monetary instrument is that it has a payment capacity that is 
infinite. This has nothing to do with the extent to which a financial instrument circulates, the 




instrument, or the characteristics of the support used to issue those financial instruments. Thus, 
even if a financial instrument circulates only in a limited geographical space, say a village,
11 but 
respects the conditions necessary in terms of maturity, par value, and nomination, then it is a 
monetary instrument. In addition, a monetary instrument may never be used as medium of 
exchange, may never be used to make payments, may never be used as store of value, and can 
never be a unit of account.  
 
4. SOME  EXAMPLES:  COMMODITY AND MONETARY SYSTEM 
 
Books on the history of money are full of “primitive monies” or “money-substitutes” used as 
medium of exchange, means of payments, or unit of account. We will study how two of them, 
cowries and tobacco, are analyzed, and show how these presentations may deform the reality or 
only present part of the story. In doing so, they prevent the reader from drawing any conclusions 
about the monetary nature of those objects, or even show that they are not monetary instruments. 
As Grierson puts it: 
 
The nature and functioning of most “primitive” currencies are known to us only through the  
  reports of casual travellers, colonial administrators, or professional anthropologists, who will not  
  always have realized what questions to ask, when they have been in a position to ask questions at 
  all, or how best to interpret the answers they received. (Grierson 1977) 
 
The drawback in the presentation usually comes from the fact that the essential properties 
of a monetary system are not well presented or understood.  
 
4.1.  Cowry Shells and Monetary Systems 
The case for cowry shells used as monetary instruments is usually presented by first looking at 
the Maldives. By relying on the words of an Arab merchant and an Arab historian of the 9
th and 
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formed the wealth of the royal treasury […] [and] when funds were getting low, the sovereign 
  sent out servants to cut branches of coconut palm and throw them into the sea. The little mollusks 
  climbed on to the branches and were collected and spread out on the sand to dry until only the 
  empty shells were left. So the royal bank was filled again. Ships from India brought goods to the 
  Maldives and took back millions of shells packed up in thousand in coconut palm leaves. It was a 
  profitable trade, for even in the seventeenth century we hear of 9,000 or 10,000 cowries being 
  bought for a rupee and sold again for three or four times as much on the mainland of India. 
 (Quiggin  1963) 
 
However, from the description given by the Arabs, one cannot conclude that cowries 
were monetary instruments used by the king to finance the purchase of foreign goods and 
services. Indeed, it is not explained what the unit of account of the Maldives was and how 
cowries were monetized, i.e., who, if anybody, issued them as debt instruments (did the royal 
authority issue them and was the royal bank ready to accept cowries in payment?), and what was 
their relationship relative to the unit of account. In addition, the role of cowries as monetary 
instruments is doubtful for the Maldives because, cowry shells were worth nothing against goods 
“except by shipload” (Polanyi 1966)—an extremely inconvenient means of payment and 
medium of exchange. What seems more logical is that the Maldives authorities were involved in 
the trade of cowries with Indian and Arab merchants. They were exporting cowries against 
imports of other goods—a situation of bilateral trade, not a situation of cowry monetary system. 
We know that Indian, Arab, and, later, after Marco Polo’s journey, European merchants made 
huge profits from the international trade of cowries, but they recorded those profits in Rupee or 
Dinar or whatever the unit of account of their respective country was (but not in terms of cowry 
shells). This example shows well that one may confuse commercial exchange and monetary 
payment. 
One way to be sure that cowries were actually used in a monetary system would be that 
cowry shells be generally accepted. Cowry shells could also be involved in a monetary system by 
giving the name “cowry” to a unit of account (even if the shells were not used in this system). 
Looking, first, at the later, it seems that there is some evidence of this. We know, for example, 
that cowries were used as unit of account in Africa (Polanyi 1966): 
 
1 toque = 40 cowries 
1 galinha = 5 toques = 200 cowries 




Quiggin (1949) also describes a system of compensations entirely determined in cowry. 
Vansina, in his analysis of the Kuba kingdom in Africa, also shows that “everything was 
calculated in cowries and most of the exchanges were made in cowries” (Vansina 1962), so one 
has to assume that most of the transactions were done in a cowry unit in those cases. The 
evidence is usually hard to find, however, because authors content themselves with a listing of 
things used as media of exchange or of units of account with no explanation. For example, the 
imposition of the unit of account has to be explained. In Dahomey, the cowry unit of account 
was imposed by the monarch (Polanyi 1966) and the king had to respect specific rules in order to 
maintain the value of the cowry (unit of account). 
As an object, one way to know if cowries were a monetary instrument is to check if an 
economic agent issued them to make payments and received them in payments (therefore 
specifying their value in terms of the unit of account), and if he promised to take them back in 
payment whenever they were presented to him (making them debt instruments with 
instantaneous maturity). As Innes put it: 
 
A priceless gem or a worthless bit of paper may equally be a token of debt, so long as the   receiver 
  knows what it stands for and the giver acknowledges his obligation to take it back in 
  payment of a debt due. (Innes 1913) 
 
From evidence, it seems that cowries were actually used in payment of taxes in Africa 
(Forstater 2005), but also in other parts of the world, like China:  
 
Cowries were received for taxes as late as the fourteenth century; the record show that 1,133,119 
  strings of cowries were received by the Treasury in A.D. 1329. (Morse 1908) 
 
That, however, fulfills only half the requirements necessary to make the cowry shells a 
debt instrument. Indeed, all kinds of objects can be accepted in payment of taxes (or fines or any 
other obligations), but they usually represent payments in kind. 
Fortunately, several authors have done more detailed studies and Forstater (2005) 
summarizes some of this literature. In the African region of Dahomey, the monarch issued 
strings of cowries to make payments and had a monopoly on the stringing. Once issued by the 
government, cowries could be used by residents of Dahomey as medium of exchange. Perhaps, 




each cowry could be detached to make payments in petty exchanges. The cowry strings were 
accepted back in payment of taxes by the government. The government controlled the supply of 
cowries so as to maintain its scarcity by controlling the importation of cowries. The government 
of Dahomey was able to do it so well that the value of the unit of account was stable from the 
17
th century to the middle of the 19
th century (Polanyi 1966). Therefore, there was an effective 
management of the cowry money supply by the government. By controlling the external inflow 
from foreign trade, by taxing, and controlling its spending, the government controlled the 
scarcity of cowries and preserved their value—the cowry was managed money. When the 
government of Dahomey failed to do so, “cowrie inflation” (Dalton 1965) prevailed, and in the 
end, the cowry monetary system had to be abandoned. 
In China, it seems that a cowry monetary system also existed at several periods in time; 
from Morse’s quote, one can suspect that the Chinese government had a control over the 
stringing of cowries. At one time, however, the system was abandoned for the opposite reason of 
Dahomey: 
 
Hwei Wan, the Prince of Ts‘in, who in his second year, i.e., 335 B.C., recognizing the difficulties 
  of finding a proper supply of shells and cowries and the rapidly increasing demand for convenient 
  currency, altogether suppressed it. (Lacouperie, quoted in Quiggin 1949). 
 
The incapacity to manage the supply to accommodate demand led, supposedly, to a 
deflationary area and the collapse of the cowry monetary system. Later, cowries were 
reintroduced by the government: 
 
Wang Mang hoped to gain favour by a return to the customs of the past. He abolished all the 
  existing types of currency including the popular wu shu, and, besides re-establishing a currency in 
  cowries and other shells he reintroduced, […] knife- and pu-money which had been out of used 
  for over 200 years. (Quiggin 1949) 
 
Swann (1950), in her translation of the Han Shu, shows that the usurper Mang (45B.C.–
23 A.D.) used cowry shells in five denominations related to a unit of account translated as 
“cash.” The suppression of metallic currency was repeated by the king of Wei after 220 A.D., but 
40 years after China went back to wu shu coin again (Quiggin 1949).  
Cowry shells seem, therefore, after a more careful (but still partial) examination, to 




by looking at the trade of cowries. The problem with most of the studies is that they fail to 
explain clearly several important points. First, they fail to explain how the unit of account came 
into existence. What was the unit of account used? Who imposed it and for what reasons? 
Second, they do not explain clearly how the cowry shells were monetized. Who issued them as 
acknowledgement of debt? What was their value in terms of the unit of account? What were the 
mechanisms that allowed the cowries to flow back to the issuer? How was the scarcity of the 
objects used as monetary instruments managed in order to preserve their value?  
As an aside, this example shows well what the main problem is with a monetary standard 
based on a commodity (or any other monetary system that has its highest form of financial 
instrument based on a material not available rapidly). Indeed, the elasticity of the supply of the 
material becomes of great importance, as well as the maintenance of a relatively fixed value of 
the material in terms of the unit of account.
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4.2.  Tobacco and Monetary Instruments 
The best example put forward to make the case that tobacco was a monetary instrument is the 




Tobacco was an accepted medium of exchange in the southern colonies. Quit rents and fines were 
  payable in tobacco. Individuals missing church were fined a pound of tobacco. In 1618, the 
  governor of Virginia issued an order that directed that “all goods should be sold at an advance of 
  twenty-five percent, and tobacco taken in payment at three shillings per pound, and not more or 
  less, on the penalty of three years of servitude to the Colony.” […] Virginia was using “tobacco 
  notes” as a substitute for currency by 1713. These notes originated after tobacco farmers in 
  Virginia began taking their tobacco crops to warehouses for weighing, testing, and storage […]. 
  The inspectors at the rolling houses were allowed to issue notes or receipts that represented the 
  amount of tobacco being held in storage for the planter. These notes were renewable and could be 
  used in lieu of tobacco for payment of debts. […] Later, in 1755, the Virginia Assembly 
  authorized the payment of tobacco debts in money at two pence per pound. Fines in Virginia were 
  payable in tobacco. For example, a master caught harboring a slave that he did not own was 
  subject to a fine of 150 pounds of tobacco. The Maryland Tobacco Inspection Act of 1747 was 
  modeled after the Virginia statute. The Maryland statute required tobacco to be inspected and 
  certified before export in order to stop trash from being put in the tobacco. […] Inspection notes 
  were given for the tobacco that was inspected. Those notes were passed as money in Maryland. 
  The use of warehouse receipts for tobacco and other commodities would spread to Kentucky as 
  settlers began to cultivate that region. (Markham 2002)  
                                                 
12 The same is true for any fixed-exchange rate system for which a direct or indirect promise of the government to 
deliver foreign currencies is established. In both systems, the government ties its hands by promising to deliver a 




Hence, it appears that in these colonies, tobacco leaves served as media of exchange and 
so, following the narrow functional approach, were a monetary instrument. However, what the 
preceding example actually shows is that the states of Virginia and Maryland were at the center 
of a redistribution system in the trade of tobacco (and other agricultural products) which was 
central to the economy of these states (Markham 2002). By accepting tax payments (fine 
payments or any other dues) in tobacco at a relatively high fixed price, they could influence 
tobacco output, could centralize production and redistribution, and could make it easier for 
farmers to pay their taxes (who usually did not have enough monetary instruments because of 
their scarcity). This, however, does not qualify the payment in tobacco as a monetary payment, 
but rather as a payment in kind at a price that was administered. It seems doubtful that tobacco 
producers would have accepted to be paid in tobacco, even more so to accept it back 
immediately in payment; like any monetary instrument is. 
Between private individuals, tobacco and other commodities could also be used to settle 
their debt positions, but Markham clearly notes right after the passage quoted above that this was 
a payment in kind: 
 
One method for financing private transactions in the colonies was through records of account kept 
  by tradesmen and planters. Credits and debits were transferred among other merchants and 
  traders. This was a form of “bookkeeping barter” in which goods were exchanged for other 
  goods, and excess credits were carried on account. The barter economy that prevailed in the 
  colonies required “voluminous record-keeping … to carry over old accounts for many years.” 
  This practice would continue through the eighteenth century […]. (Markham 2002) 
 
Thus, tobacco was not a monetary instrument. Also, note that the author actually makes a 
distinction between a medium of exchange (tobacco) and money—the payment of tobacco debts 
was made possible “in money at two pence per pound.” This clearly shows that tobacco was not 
a monetary instrument, but rather a commodity with an administered price that could be used 
instead of monetary instruments to settle debts written in a unit other than tobacco.  
The two previous quotes, however, give us some clues about the monetary system that 
existed. First, whereas tobacco was not a financial instrument, tobacco notes were a debt 
instrument of the government warehouses representing ₤x, depending on the volume of tobacco 
they embodied and the administered monetary value of a pound of tobacco. Thus, tobacco notes 




clear is said about that. We are only told that they were used “in lieu of tobacco for payment of 
debts” and “passed as money in Maryland.” This is a good illustration of how the functional 
approach may lead to skip a detailed study of the “moneyness” of a financial instrument and to 
talk extensively about an object that does not even pass the qualities necessary to be a financial 
instrument. Second, the bookkeeping system was actually more complicated than presented 
above (Littleton 1956). Indeed, credits on an account were sometimes transferable at par, making 
them monetary instruments. Thus, a national monetary system based on the English pound was 
present during this period in the United States, even though its functioning was not very smooth 
given the too high scarcity of top monetary instruments (coins and notes) and the localized 
emergence of generally acceptable bookkeeping transfers. Tobacco, however, was not part of 




The study of monetary history and the monetary system is a complex matter that cannot rely on 
checking for the functions performed by an object. Using the functional approach to money will 
prevent differentiating between monetary payments, payments in kind, or simple commercial 
exchanges. This will also prevent the inquirer from detecting monetary systems or lead him to 
assume that a monetary system exists where there is none. Anything can be a monetary 
instrument and any type of support can be used to issue monetary instrument, as those are 
unimportant determinants of what a monetary instrument is. What matters is the existence of 
specific monetary characteristics; monetary instruments are generally accepted financial 
instruments. All monetary systems rest on debit/credit and assets/liabilities relationships because 
all monetary instruments are acknowledgments of debt.  
The alternative theoretical framework used to understand “money” implies that many of 
the “primitive monies” were in fact not monetary instruments, at least not until more information 
is provided. Unfortunately, many of the early studies available cannot be repeated.  
This alternative framework also has important theoretical implications. First, it shows 
that any modeling must take into account the financial implications of economic decisions. This 
means that the accounting framework of a model must be stated explicitly. Second, one can 




Because of the nature of money (debit/credit relationship), any model with money must have 
debtors with a shortage of monetary instruments. This is sufficient to create a demand for money. 
If the state does not exist, debtors with a shortage of bank monetary instruments create a demand 
for the latter. Third, related to the previous point, monetary instruments cannot be modeled as 
pure assets, i.e., like a commodity. This is against the logic of monetary instruments to be pure 
assets, they are all bets against the future. 
The alternative theoretical understanding of money also greatly improves our 
understanding of monetary mechanisms. It shows, for example, that the issuer of top monetary 
instruments, today the sovereign State, makes its acknowledgement of debt accepted by 
imposing a debt on others and by promising to take its acknowledgements of debt in payment at 
a defined value. The state does so because it is the way financial instruments work—there must 
be a reflux mechanism. Taxes and bonds are not financing methods for the (federal) government 
because they cannot be implemented before the top monetary instrument has been injected. The 
framework also helps to understand why using a precious material or having a narrow view of 
what money is (which led to the monetarist experience) had a large negative impact on the 
economic system. Given the nature of financial instruments (bets against the future), what 
matters is the credibility of the issuer. This is regulated by economic and political confidence, 
not by tying up the hand of the issuer immediately (via a gold standard, a fixed exchange rate 
regime, high collateral, etc.). Not until the end of 19
th century was the “standard formula” 
(Sargent and Velde 1997) for running monetary system using precious material understood, 
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